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Abstract: One-shot interaction and repeated interaction often co-exist in the real world. 
We study possible behavioral effects of this co-existence in a principal-agent setting, in 
which a principal simultaneously employs a permanent and a temporary agent. Our 
experimental results indicate that there is “discrimination” between the two agents and that 
the available information for agents determines the extent of this discrimination, even 
though the theoretical solution of the game implies equal treatment of agents. 
Discrimination is, thus, a consequence of reciprocity. Agents that are discriminated against 
react negatively by withholding effort. 
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 0161  Introduction 
Repeated interaction often co-exists with one-shot interaction in the same group. Work 
teams or clubs, for instance, may consist of permanent members and temporary members 
with a much shorter interaction horizon. Firms employ workers with permanent contracts 
and temporary workers often even for the same job and in the same department. University 
hire permanent faculty alongside non-tenured faculty. In this paper, we study the effects of 
the co-existence of repeated interaction and one-shot interaction. We first model an 
appropriate principal-agent situation. Based on the theoretical predictions from our model, 
we conduct a series of controlled laboratory experiments. 
In our model, principals employ two agents and can determine a fixed wage and a 
piece rate for each of them. One agent is a permanent agent that stays with the same 
principal for a commonly known number of periods; the other agent is a temporary agent 
that is assigned to another principal in every period. After being informed about the 
contract(s) offered by the principal, agents determine their costly effort levels. Our 
treatments are implemented in a way that – according to the theoretical benchmark of 
money-maximizing agents – there should not be any discrimination
1 between the two 
agents by the principal. 
The tenure of a relationship has been shown to strongly influence the terms of 
contracts on labor markets (Brown et al., 2004). There is ample evidence for gift-exchange 
games with incomplete contracts that wages exceed the marginal product of labor (Fehr et 
al., 1993; Fehr et al., 1998a, b; Fehr and Falk, 1999) even in a one-shot setting because of 
reciprocity. However, the effect is usually much stronger in a repeated interaction.
2 In a 
repeated interaction, a possible reputation effect comes on top of the originally described 
fair wage-effort effect (Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). 
                                                 
1 We use the term “discrimination” throughout the paper without negative connotation. It simply indicates 
whether principals offer different contract terms to the different agents. 
2 For an overview of the “early” experimental literature on the gift-exchange game, see Gächter and Fehr 
(2000). It is important to note that there is some discussion on the robustness of the gift-exchange results 
(Levitt and List, 2007). However, even if gift-exchange is not always robust (e.g., Hannan et al., 2002; 
Charness et al., 2004), most field studies show a certain level of it (a recent overview is provided by Cooper 
and Kagel, 2009). In our study, we are not going to interpret the level of gift-exchange, but rather the 
difference in gift-exchange across different experimental treatments and agent types. 
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environments, i.e. entirely incomplete contracts. A couple of papers employ partly 
incomplete contracts that use a fixed wage and possible bonuses and fines. In Fehr et al. 
(2007) paying the bonus is at the discretion of the principal after the agent has chosen the 
effort, whereas bonuses and fines are enforceable in Gächter et al. (2009). 
Not many experimental papers study complete contract designs. Anderhub et al. 
(2002) investigate behavior within a principal-agent experiment that allows for a large 
class of linear contracts. They find a high degree of incentive-compatible behavior, but 
also fair sharing and reciprocity. A similar result is provided by Güth et al. (1998) in a 
dynamic principal-agent environment. Keser and Willinger (2000) present evidence that 
subjects in the role of agents choose payoff-maximizing action, while subjects in the role 
of principals offer non-optimal contracts. Anderhub et al. (2003) study the relationship 
between contract duration and firm-specific investments in a principal-agent setting. In 
contrast to the game-theoretic prediction for their setup, they observe reduced investments 
in short-term contracts compared to long-term contracts. 
We are, however, not aware of any paper studying whether and how the co-existence 
of permanent and temporary agents – which is obviously widespread on modern labor 
markets  – affects these results.
3 More specifically, we ask two sets of main research 
questions: (i) Do principals discriminate between the two types of agents, and if so which 
type is favored? How do agents react to such discrimination? (ii) Which role does the level 
of information on contract details among agents play; or in other words: Do principals 
condition their contract offers on whether agents know the contracts of their co-workers or 
not? 
Our main findings indicate a significant degree of discrimination. It is stronger where 
the two agents are not informed about contract details before exerting effort and weaker 
where information is given. It is important to note that there is no reason to discriminate 
according to the standard theoretical solution of our principal-agent game. Thus, 
discrimination is purely behavioral in the sense that only reciprocity or, more general, 
social preferences can explain its existence. Put differently, reciprocity among the principal 
and the permanently employed agent causes discrimination within the firm. The latter 
                                                 
3 Alewell et al. (2007) analyze the co-employment of hired and rented hands in a principal-agent setting. In 
their model rented hands are employed due to unexpected higher demand, and there are no long-term 
relationships. 
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principal-agent games in the laboratory are strategic and not intrinsic. Agents respond 
strongly to contractual incentives, no matter whether they are permanently employed or 
only temporarily. As expected, for temporary agents, being discriminated against has a 
strong and significant effect on effort provision: they “punish” principals by reducing their 
effort when being discriminated against in fixed wages and reward principals for equal 
treatment in piece rate wages. Anticipating such responses, it is optimal for principals not 
to discriminate, although the negative effect of discrimination on principal’s profits is 
small. Hence, those principals who do not discriminate seem to have an additional non-
monetary preference for non-discrimination. 
Our paper is also related to a small but increasing set of experimental papers that take 
multiple (homogeneous) agents into account. Cabrales and Charness (2003) study the 
optimality of different contracts offered by one principal simultaneously to two differently 
productive agents in a hidden information context. In their experiment, contracts have to be 
accepted by both agents. Cabrales and Charness (2003) thereby contemplate the common 
situation where contracts must be negotiated with a union and, then, be approved by the 
workers. The paper focuses on the characteristics of the chosen contract menus and 
evaluates them against social preference models. Maximiano et al. (2007) compare a 
standard bilateral gift-exchange game with a setting where each principal is matched with 
four agents. They observe almost equal levels of reciprocity in one-shot interactions, even 
though the principal earns much more than the agents if she employs four agents. In a 
similar vein but with a focus on horizontal comparisons rather than vertical ones, Charness 
and Kuhn (2007) test predictions from social preference models on whether the behavior of 
two workers in the same firm is affected by the respective co-worker’s wage. Contrary to 
their expectations that a wage compression effect should be observable, their experiments 
indicate that workers' effort choices are highly sensitive to their own wages, but largely 
unresponsive to co-workers' wages. 
Altmann et al. (2009) extend the setting of Brown et al. (2004) to one in which firms 
can employ no, one or two agents. They are interested in the interaction of contract 
completeness with unemployment and find that firms pay high wages but offer fewer 
vacancies than possible and efficient from a standard viewpoint. Finally, Kocher et al. 
(2010) study contract standardization for the same job within a given firm. More 
specifically, they analyze whether such standardization has any effects on incomplete 
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In a gift-exchange experiment with a market on which principals can offer contracts and 
employ several agents, they observe in contrast to theoretical predictions that contract 
standardization leads to significantly higher wages, effort levels and a higher market 
efficiency. 
Our research questions regarding the effects of contract disclosure are related to a 
much larger body of literature on social comparison.
4. While Maximiano, Sloof and 
Sonnemans (2007) as well as Charness and Kuhn (2007) provide some evidence that the 
vertical comparison (between the principal and the single agent) seems to be more 
important than the horizontal comparison (between agents), there is also some counter-
evidence in other contexts. Knez and Camerer (1995), for instance, report a modest effect 
in a three-person ultimatum game with one proposer and two responders, who receive (and 
observe) different offers given their different outside options. In a standard ultimatum 
game, Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) provide evidence that information on average offers 
influences decisions of responders. In another experimental setting that is more similar to 
our labor market Güth et al. (2001) show that horizontal fairness matters at least as far as 
principals are concerned. Principals prefer to submit more equitable offers when work 
contracts are observable to both agents. In a similar vein, Alewell and Nicklisch (2009) 
study the effect of social comparison for wage acceptance in multilateral ultimatum games. 
The results of their laboratory experiments indicate that the availability of information 
concerning ultimatum offers to other responders influences acceptance behavior. 
Principal-agent settings have been studied extensively in field experiments over the 
last couple of years. While the picture is not fully conclusive concerning the persistency of 
gift-exchange, the basic result that reciprocity plays a role on many labor markets has been 
confirmed quite generally (Cooper and Kagel, 2009). As with laboratory experiments, we 
are not aware of any field experiment that observes permanent agents and temporary 
agents working alongside each other.
5 There is, however, some related evidence from 
natural field data providing results in favor of the wage compression effect for workers. 
Management’s and worker groups’ interests seem to be aligned on that issue (Lazear, 
                                                 
4 Festinger (1954) and Deutsch (1985) are the classic references from social psychology, but the literature is 
huge. 
5 There are many field studies that analyze the interaction between a principal and an agent. See, for instance, 
Gneezy and List (2006). 
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structures to prevent uncooperative behavior among workers. Outside the laboratory it is, 
however, very difficult to control for the effort costs of agents, the relevant interaction 
horizons and the information conditions, whose consequences we are particularly 
interested in. Furthermore, selection into types is often endogenous in the field, whereas an 
experiment solves the problem by assigning subjects randomly to treatments.
6 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the principal-
agent model in more detail. In Section 3, we describe the experimental design and derive 
some behavioral predictions. Section 4 presents our experimental results, and Section 5 
concludes the paper and discusses implications of our findings. 
 
2  The basic principal-agent setup 
The principal (P) of a firm employs two workers, a permanent agent (PA) and a temporary 
agent (TA), to produce a good which is sold at the positive price p. A contract offer 
{ i i i e s w } ~ , ,  to an agent   in a given period  { TA PA i , = } { } T N t   ,..., ..,   , 2   , 1 ∈  consists of a non-
negative fixed wage wi, a piece rate si (with  p si ≤ ≤ 0 ) and a desired non-binding effort 
level 0 ~ ≥ i e
i c
.
7 Knowing at least her own contract or, depending on the treatment, both 
contracts, an agent decides on the effort level that she wants to exert. The cost of effort 
function   for the production of one unit of a good is convex in effort, where ci 
denotes the positive cost parameter of an agent. The timing of the interaction in each 
period is standard: first, P simultaneously offers a contract to both PA and TA. Then, both 







                                                 
6 Torgler et al. (2009) provide an interesting empirical study on social comparison among players in football 
teams. 
7 For notational convenience we suppress the time index whenever it is not necessary. 
8 Since both agents are assumed to have no outside option and the fixed payments are restricted to be non-
negative, we assume that agents automatically accept the contracts proposed to them by P. At most, they may 
“reject” the contract by exercising zero effort. Non-negativity of wi also excludes internalizing the positive 
externalities of effort through si = p in exchange for a negative payment wi. Such a franchising solution is 
assumed to be infeasible due to exogenous restrictions. In our setup, si is interpreted as a share of  .  i pe
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PA PA PA PA e
c





TA TA TA TA e
c
e s w ⋅ − ⋅ + = π  for the temporary agent  (3) 
The temporary agent is only employed for one single period by the same principal, 
whereas the permanent agent is employed for N periods with  T N < < 1 , where T is the 
finite number of periods played in a session. Note that the two agents – except for possible 
behavioral effects from the comparison on what they individually earn when being co-
employed – are structurally unrelated. Since N and T are finite, the theoretical solution to 
this interaction is straightforward. Assuming common knowledge of rationality and purely 
selfish preferences yields a stationary equilibrium for the multi-stage game, with the 
equilibrium of the base game being played repeatedly. An agent’s optimal effort is 
. Anticipating optimal efforts the principal’s optimal contract offer to each of 
the two agents is 
i i i c s e / * =
{ } i i i e p s w ~ , 2 / * , 0 * = =  with any  i e ~ , because  i e ~  is just cheap talk. 
Substituting yields the solution play: 





e i i i
i




* = = = =  (4) 
 
3  Experimental design and behavioral predictions 
3.1  Experimental treatments and parameters 
Our interest is in discrimination between long-term and short-term agents, the possible 
reaction to such discrimination, the behavioral effects of a short-term relationship on a 
concurrent long-term relationship in a principal-agent setting, and the role of information. 
The two treatments that we implemented are, therefore, straightforward: 
 
Treatment INFO: In each phase of the experiment, the permanent agent 
repeatedly interacts with one principal, whereas the temporary agent is randomly 
assigned to another principal in every new period. The two agents have the same 
effort-cost parameter and are informed about the contract details of their co-
workers before exerting effort. 
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Treatment NOINFO: In each phase of the experiment, the permanent agent 
repeatedly interacts with one principal, whereas the temporary agent is randomly 
assigned to another principal in every new period. The two agents have the same 
effort-cost parameter, but are NOT informed about the contract details of their co-
workers before exerting effort. 
 
Parameter ranges were chosen as follows:  ] 100 , 0 [ ∈ w ,  ,  ,  ] 4 , 0 [ ∈ s ] 100 , 0 [ ∈ e
] 100 , 0 [ ~∈ e
10 = N
. Numbers with up to two decimals were allowed. Furthermore p = 4,  c = 0.05, 
, and   in all treatments. All parameters are common knowledge among 
participants in the experiment. The feedback conditions after each period are standard: 
Principals are informed about both workers’ effort choices and their own profit; agents 
only receive feedback on their own profits, but not on the profits of co-workers. Thus, even 
in treatment INFO an agent cannot compare payoffs, since the effort choice of the other 
agent is not revealed. 
20 = T
The chosen parameters imply the optimal contract of 
TA PA i e w s e i i i i , for    ~ , 0 * , 2 * , 40 * = = = =  (5) 
Consequently,  160 = P π  for the principal, and  40 = = TA PA π π  for each of the agents 
in equilibrium. The socially optimal solution would imply   
regardless of s and w. Due to the quadratic costs of effort, a higher than equilibrium effort 
is always more beneficial for the principal than for the agent. A principal can aim to elicit 
such a higher effort level from a reciprocal agent through a raise in the wage w and/or a 
raise in the piece-rate s. 
TA PA i ei , for     80 * = =
 
3.2  Hypotheses 
According to the standard theoretical benchmark, principals do not offer differentiated 
contracts to the two types of agents in any of our treatments. The only relevant contract 
component, the piece rate, does not depend on the characteristics of the worker but only on 
the exogenous price, and agents best-respond to the piece rate. 
 
H1. Principals will offer equal contracts to both agents PA and TA with contract 
terms corresponding to the theoretical benchmark. 
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H2. Agents will best-respond to offered piece rates, ignoring fixed wages and 
desired effort level. 
 
However, evidence from principal-agent experiments show that many people do not 
behave according to the standard theoretical benchmark. Previous experimental findings 
inspired different attempts to capture other-regarding concerns. Deriving point-predictions 
using social preference models is difficult and somewhat arbitrary in our context. It 
depends critically on how one defines reference groups, e.g. whether the reference group 
for an agent includes only the co-worker in the treatment with information or also the 
principal. We, therefore, focus on qualitative predictions when we discuss other-regarding 
concerns. 
Neither opportunistic, nor inequity-averse players should be affected by the interaction 
horizon and the information condition. More interesting types of players are those who 
behave reciprocally out of strategic motives. Brown et al. (2004) and Fehr et al. (2007) 
have shown for a somewhat different setting
9 with only fixed wages that opportunistic 
agents initially have an incentive to mimic fair agents, when the proportion of fair 
principals is large enough in the population until the second to last period of a repeated 
interaction. 
In the role of temporary agents such strategic cooperators would behave completely 
opportunistically, whereas in the role of permanent agents they would act reciprocally. 
Consequently, fair-minded and opportunistic principals may offer generous contracts, e.g. 
offer a positive fixed wage or a piece rate s > 2 to permanent agents. In order to be an 
equilibrium such a strategy combination requires that the number of fair-minded agents 
and strategic agents together is sufficiently large. Furthermore, if principals assume that 
the number of fair-minded agents is small enough (so that most agents will not react 
negatively to discrimination), strategic principals may offer different contracts to the two 
agents even in the INFO treatment. Hence, discrimination should be smaller in the 
treatment with disclosure, without necessarily ruling out discrimination. 
 
                                                 
9 In these settings, the kind of relationship (permanent or transitory) was endogenously determined and not 
exogenously varied as in our experiment. 
  8
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 016aH1. In line with the fair-wage hypothesis (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990), principals 
offer, on average, more generous contract conditions than predicted by the 
theoretical benchmark. They use the fixed wage to induce higher effort levels in the 
spirit of gift exchange, because its signal is more obvious. 
 
aH2: Principals discriminate against temporary workers in NOINFO, but less so in 
INFO. 
 
aH3: Agents on average behave reciprocally. For temporary agents this may mean 
that they shirk in case of discrimination. 
 
3.3  Experimental procedures 
The computerized experiment was conducted at the laboratory of the Max Planck Institute 
in Jena (Germany). It was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). A total of 108 
participants (all undergraduate students at the University of Jena, invited using the 
organizational software ORSEE by Greiner, 2004) took part in the four sessions of the 
experiment (two per treatment). The same number of participants (54 per treatment) faced 
either the scenario in which (1) all workers received information about the coworker’s 
contract (INFO), or the scenario (2) in which workers did not receive any information 
about the coworker’s contract (NOINFO). We used matching groups consisting of nine 
participants. 
Sessions proceeded in the following way: upon entering the laboratory, participants 
were randomly assigned to cubicles and provided with written instructions. After sufficient 
reading time, the instructions (see Appendix) were also read out aloud by the experimenter. 
Participants were, then, asked to answer a set of control questions to make sure that the 
rules of the experiment have been fully understood. Any incorrect entries were corrected 
and all remaining questions clarified before the experiment started. Roles of agents were 
described in neutral terms (“type A” and “type B”). 
Each session extended over a total of 20 periods, which were grouped into two phases 
of ten periods each. The course of action in a specific period followed the procedure 
described above. Sessions lasted for about 60 minutes. At the end of each session, the 
accumulated period profits in experimental currency units (ECU) were converted into euro 
at the pre-announced rate of 200 ECU = € 1.00. Average earnings were € 7.63 per subject. 
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bonus of € 2.50. 
 
4  Experimental results 
In reporting our experimental results, we proceed as follows: We first analyze the extent of 
discrimination between permanent and temporary agents by the principal (Section 4.1). 
Then, we proceed to discuss the behavior of agents in our two treatments (Section 4.2). 
Section 4.3 provides a more extensive treatment of the determinants of principals’ profits. 
 
4.1  First overview and evidence for discrimination 
4.1.1  Descriptive overview 
We start by reporting descriptive results for our two treatments: information about co-
workers contracts (INFO) and no information on co-workers contracts (NOINFO). Table 1 
gives a first overview of the results. On the average level, there appears to be a difference 
between the two treatments in terms of the fixed wage, but it is not significant on standard 
levels if we compare completely independent observations on the matching group level. 
Comparing the two types of agents within a treatment, in NOINFO permanent agents 
receive significantly higher fixed wages (p = 0.046) and piece rate wages (p = 0.075) than 
temporary agents (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
10). This is not the case in the INFO 
treatment. 
 
Table 1: Choices of principals and agents 
   Fixed wage  Piece rate   Actual effort  Desired effort 
   PA TA  PA  TA  PA TA PA TA 
INFO  Mean  15.94 15.54 2.24 2.24 42.69 43.74 63.41 65.33
  Median  9.00 5.75 2.00 2.00 42.00 40.00  60.00  62.00
  Std. Dev.  21.36 21.09 0.70 0.67 18.64 15.67 21.14 22.14
NOINFO  Mean  24.23 21.48 2.11 1.99 40.09 38.79 48.18 49.28
  Median  20.00 19.50 2.00 2.00 40.00 40.00 50.00 50.00
  Std. Dev.  19.98 19.88 0.79 0.83 18.85 18.37 25.93 27.36
Note: Std. Dev. = standard deviation 
 
                                                 
10 All non-parametric tests in this paper are based on averages on the level of statistically completely 
independent matching groups. Tests are always two-sided. 
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to the equilibrium solution (with s* = 2 and e* = 40), on average, the fixed wage w 
deviates significantly and persistently over the 20 periods from the theoretical prediction of 
zero in both treatments (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.002). Although declining over time, 
it stays above 10 in INFO and above 15 in NOINFO even in period 20. Time trends are 
shown in Figure 1. 
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 016On average over all periods, piece rate wages in INFO are significantly larger than 2 
for both types of agents (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.040). In NOINFO piece rate wages 
are higher than 2 for permanent agents (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.040) and not 
different from 2 for temporary agents. In the following we will take a closer look at the 
discrimination of principals between the two agents on the level of a single principal. 
 
4.1.2  Evidence of discrimination and its determinants 
Table 2 provides evidence for discrimination against the temporary agent on the level 
of the individual principal. We distinguish between three different cases: (i) the permanent 
agent is treated favorably either in the fixed wage or the piece rate and not treated 
unfavorably in the other (i.e.,   and   with one strict inequality); (ii) the 
temporary agent is treated favorably either in the fixed wage or the piece rate and not 
treated unfavorably in the other (i.e., 
TA PA w w ≥
PA w
TA PA s s ≥
TA w ≤  and  TA PA s s ≤  with one strict inequality); 
and (iii) both agents are treated equally (i.e.,  TA PA w w =  and  TA s PA s = ). Figures in Table 2 
do not add up to 100% because there is a residual category. 
 
Table 2: Discrimination by contract offers 
 NOINFO  INFO 
Permanent agent is favoured  143 (40%)  85 (24%) 
Temporary agent is favoured  53 (15%)  46 (13%) 
Equal treatment  111 (31%)  198 (55%) 
Total decisions  360 360 
 
Table 2 reveals that making contracts of co-workers public within firms leads to more 
equal treatment in terms of contracts. Whereas 55% of all contract offers for the two agents 
are identical in the treatment INFO, for the case without information about co-workers 
contracts, in treatment NOINFO, the relevant figure is only 31%. Without any horizontal 
information on contracts among agents, the permanent agent is favored in 40% of all cases. 
The distributions over the three categories in the two treatments are highly significantly 
different from each other (χ
2-test; p < 0.001). 
To take a closer look at the determinants of contracts chosen by principals, we linearly 
regress contract components on a treatment dummy for NOINFO (i.e., we take INFO as 
the reference treatment, also in later regressions), a period indicator and a dummy for the 
type of agent. Table 3 provides the results: Permanent agents receive significantly higher 
  12
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effort from permanent agents. In NOINFO fixed wages are higher and piece rate wages are 
lower than in INFO. More experienced principals offer higher piece rate wages and lower 
fixed wages. 
 
Table 3: Determinants of contracts 
Note: Linear OLS regressions with individual- and matching group-specific fixed effects. The columns show 
standardized coefficient estimates with their corresponding standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Dependent variable  Fixed wage   Piece rate  Desired effort 
Independent variables  I  II  III 
NOINFO dummy  0.62
*** -0.29*  0.11 




 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Period 1 of phases 1, 2  -0.09  -0.16
** -0.06 
 (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
Permanent agent dummy  0.08
** 0.07* -0.08
* 
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Constant   -0.61
*** 0.11 -0.58
*** 
 (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
N 1351  1351  1351 
 
In Table 4, we directly investigate the determinants of discrimination. More 
specifically, we assess the propensity for discrimination by employing a logit regression 
where the dependent variable is equal to one if the fixed wage (piece rate) of agent i is 
lower than the fixed wage (piece rate) of agent j, her co-worker, and zero otherwise. Cases 
in which   and/or   are coded as zero. We, furthermore, control for time and, 
of course, dummies for the treatment and the decision maker in the role of permanent 
agent. 
j i w w = j i s s =
According to the results, the propensity for discrimination in fixed wages is 
significantly higher in NOINFO. Permanent agents are less likely to be discriminated 
against with respect to both fixed and piece rate wages, and the effect is mainly driven by 
the NOINFO treatment (see model IV). Discrimination is also less likely in the first period 
of a new phase in which both agents the temporary and the permanent agent do not have 
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Dependent variables  Propensity for discrimination in… 
  fixed wages  piece rate 
Independent variables  I  II  III  IV 
NOINFO dummy  0.85*  1.02
** 0.32  0.61 
 (0.46)  (0.50)  (0.42)  (0.44) 
Period -0.00  -0.00  0.02  0.02 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 





 (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.29)  (0.29) 




 (0.21)  (0.32)  (0.19)  (0.28) 
PA dummy * NOINFO  -  -0.37  -  -0.61* 






 (0.38)  (0.39)  (0.35)  (0.35) 
N 1440  1440  1440  1440 
Note: Logit random effects regressions with individual-specific random effects and matching group-specific fixed effects. 
The columns show standardized coefficient estimates with their corresponding standard errors in the subsequent column. 
The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
In summary, principals treat the two agents differently in both treatments, but less so 
in the treatment with public information about contract offers. This result is consistent with 
our alternative hypotheses aH2. The average values of the piece rate wages correspond to 
the theoretical benchmark. However, principals offer fixed wages that are significantly 
above zero to both agents in order to induce higher levels of effort (consistent with aH1). 
Overall, we find support for our alternative hypotheses aH1 and aH2. 
 
4.2  Behavior of agents and reciprocity 
4.2.1  Determinants of effort choices 
Table 1 shows that actual effort levels are, on average, close to the equilibrium prediction 
under standard assumptions of e* = 40. However, note that the individually optimal effort 
choice is a function of the offered piece rate wage. Hence, one has to take contract offers 
into account when assessing the response of agents. This is done in Table 5. We regress 
actual effort on the three contract components, a dummy variable for treatment NOINFO, a 
time trend and four dummy variables for equality and discrimination in fixed and piece 
rate wages, interacted with INFO, since only in INFO participants can compare contract 
conditions. Discrimination in fixed (piece rate) wages is captured by a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one, if the fixed wage (piece rate) of an agent i is lower than the 
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permanent and/or temporary agents. The dummy for equality in the fixed wage (piece rate) 
takes the value one, if wages are the same and zero otherwise. Panel A of Table 5 presents 
the regression results for permanent agents and panel B for temporary agents. 
 
Table 5: Determinants of effort choice and reciprocity 
Panel A – Permanent agents: 
Note: Linear random effects regressions with individual-specific random effects and matching group-specific fixed 
effects. The columns show standardized coefficient estimates with their corresponding standard errors in the subsequent 
column. The symbols *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Dependent variable: actual effort  I II  III  IV V 






  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 






  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Desired effort level ( )  PA e ~ - 0.05  0.04  0.05  0.05 
   (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
NOINFO  dummy  -  - 0.05 - 0.57
** 
     (0.28)    (0.28) 
Period -  -  0.01  0.01  0.01 
     (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Period1 in phases 1, 2  -  -  0.05  0.06  0.06 
     (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08) 
TA PA w w −  (if < 0)dummy * INFO  - - -  -0.04  -0.04 
       (0.12)  (0.12) 
TA PA w w =  dummy * INFO  - - -  0.11  0.11 
       (0.10)  (0.10) 
TA PA s s −  (if < 0) dummy * INFO  - - -  0.18  0.18 
       (0.13)  (0.13) 
TA PA s s =  dummy * INFO  - - -  -0.02  -0.02 
       (0.10)  (0.10) 
Constant 0.07  -0.08  -0.14  -0.23  -0.57
*** 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) 
N  720 720 720 720 720 
 
The effort choice of permanent agents is positively and significantly determined by 
fixed and piece rate wages with the impact of the piece rate coefficient being more than 
three times larger than the impact of the fixed wage coefficient. Note that the table 
provides standardized coefficients. Hence, the size of the coefficients is directly 
comparable. Permanent agents seem insensitive to differential treatment by principals, 
which is not surprising, since normally they are treated more favorably. Hence, 
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are far from being significant. 
 
Panel B – Temporary agents: 
Note: Linear random effects regressions with individual-specific random effects and matching group-specific fixed 
effects. The columns show standardized coefficient estimates with their corresponding standard errors in the subsequent 
column. The symbols *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Dependent variable: actual effort  I II  III  IV  V 






  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 






  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Desired effort level ( )  TA e ~ -  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
NOINFO dummy  -  -  0.48
*** -  0.29 
     (0.17)  (0.21) 
Period -  -  0.00  0.00  0.00 
     (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Period 1 in phase 1, 2  -  -  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03 
     (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
PA TA w w −  (if < 0) dummy * INFO  - - -  -0.18*  -0.18* 
      (0.11)  (0.11) 
PA TA w w =  dummy * INFO  - - -  -0.16  -0.16 
      (0.11)  (0.11) 
PA TA s s −  (if < 0) dummy * INFO  - - -  0.12  0.12 
      (0.12)  (0.12) 
PA TA s s =  dummy * INFO  - - -  0.31
*** 0.31
*** 
      (0.10)  (0.10) 




  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.18) 
N  720 720 720 720 720 
 
Similar to permanent agents, temporary agents respond positively to higher fixed and 
piece rate wages (see Table 5, Panel B). The difference in the impact of piece rate wages 
compared to fixed wages is also present and even larger in magnitude than for permanent 
agents. In contrast to permanent agents, temporary agents react more sensitively to 
discrimination. They “punish” principals by reducing their effort when being discriminated 
against in fixed wages, but only weakly significantly so, and “reward” principals for equal 
treatment in piece rate wages. The effects of such reward and punishment on effort exerted 
are larger in magnitude than the effect created by the fixed wage. Hence, discrimination 
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aH3. 
4.2.2  Voluntary cooperation by agents 
 
Table 6: Propensity and intensity of voluntary cooperation by agents 
Panel A – Permanent agents: 
Note: Logit random effects regressions (I, II), and linear random effects regressions (III, IV) with individual-specific 
random effects and matching group-specific fixed effects. The columns show standardized coefficient estimates with 
their corresponding standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Dependent variables  Propensity for 
voluntary cooperation 
Intensity of voluntary 
cooperation 
Independent variables  I II  III  IV 





  (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) 
Piece rate wage (sPA) -0.16  -0.15  0.04  0.05 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) 
Desired effort level ( )  PA e ~ 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 




  (0.54) (0.72) (0.49) (0.63) 
Period -0.003  -0.004  -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Period 1 of phases 1, 2  0.01  0.02  0.06  0.08 
  (0.31) (0.31) (0.21) (0.22) 
TA PA w w − (if < 0) dummy * INFO  - -0.30 - 0.12 
   (0.45)  (0.34) 
TA PA w w =  dummy * INFO  - 0.06 - 0.20 
   (0.37)  (0.25) 
TA PA s s −  (if < 0) dummy * INFO  - 0.01 - 0.03 
   (0.47)  (0.32) 
TA PA s s =  dummy * INFO  - -0.35 - -0.33 
   (0.36)  (0.27) 
Constant -2.73
*** -1.39
** 0.02  0.18 
  (0.51) (0.66) (0.42) (0.54) 
N  720 720 198 198 
 
Table 6 provides evidence on the propensity and the intensity of voluntary cooperation 
by agents. Agents voluntarily cooperate with the principal when they choose effort levels 
that are higher than optimal, for the offered piece rate and the individual cost parameter. 
The variable “propensity for voluntary cooperation” takes the value one, if actual effort is 
higher than optimal effort and zero otherwise. “Intensity of voluntary cooperation” is the 
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we run separate regressions for permanent agents (Table 6, Panel A) and temporary agents 
(Table 6, Panel B). 
 
Panel B – Temporary agents: 
Note: Logit random effects regressions (I, II), and linear random effects regression (III, IV) with individual-specific 
random effects and matching group-specific fixed effects. The columns show standardized coefficient estimates with 
their corresponding standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Dependent variables  Propensity for 
voluntary cooperation 
Intensity of voluntary 
cooperation 
Independent variables  I  II  III  IV 
Fixed wage (wTA) 0.48
*** 0.45
*** 0.10  0.10 
 (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
Piece rate wage (sTA) 0.02  0.03  -0.09  -0.09 
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
Desired effort level ( )  TA e ~ -0.02 -0.01 0.00  -0.01 
 (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
NOINFO-dummy 22.58  -0.04  0.23  0.43 
 (14.48)  (0.94)  (0.61)  (0.78) 
Period -0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Period 1 of phases 1, 2  0.31  0.31  -0.26  -0.26 
 (0.31)  (0.31)  (0.24)  (0.25) 
PA TA w w −  (if < 0) dummy * INFO  - -0.82 -  0.10 
   (0.51)    (0.41) 
PA TA w w =  dummy * INFO  - -0.03 -  0.08 
   (0.46)    (0.38) 
PA TA s s −  (if < 0) dummy * INFO  - 0.07 - -0.09 
   (0.50)    (0.43) 
PA TA s s =  dummy * INFO  - -0.33 -  0.14 
   (0.46)    (0.38) 
Constant -23.89  -1.23  -0.49  -0.71 
 (14.48)  (0.80)  (0.47)  (0.66) 
N  720 720 186 186 
 
Fixed wages have a positive effect on the probability for cooperation of permanent 
agents (see Panel A). Further, permanent agents are more likely to cooperate in treatment 
NOINFO. As can be seen in Panel B, fixed wages also influence the propensity for 
cooperation of temporary agents. All other variables here are not significant. 
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Figure 2 – Panel A: Piece rate wage with principals’ profits (upper part) and 
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We finally take a look on behaviorally optimal contracts, i.e. what principals should 
have done, given the actual response of agents. Not surprisingly, the ex-post optimal piece-
rate wage is around 2, which is the theoretical prediction under standard assumptions. 
Interestingly, the ex-post payoff function of principals around this prediction is quite flat, 
i.e., negative or especially positive deviations from the optimal contract design do not 
decrease actual payoffs as strongly as expected for sequentially rational agents. Note that 
some of the categories contain a small number of observations; hence, the small spikes 
should not be over-interpreted. However, in treatment INFO piece rates above 2 offered to 
permanent agents seem to be more beneficial than the optimal contract. Figures 2 and 3 as 
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fixed wages and piece rates for the two types of agents. 
 
Figure 2 – Panel B: Piece rate wage with principals’ profits (upper part) and number of 
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In both treatments it would have been optimal for principals to offer a fixed wage of 
zero. However, the average profit of principals is rather constant up to a fixed wage of 20. 
Obviously, principals faced both reciprocal and non-reciprocal agents, but the number of 
reciprocal agents was not large enough to render a positive fixed wage profitable ex post. 
Nevertheless, many principals chose higher fixed wages, especially in the NOINFO 
treatment (see Figure 3, Panel B). In this treatment, the distinction between reciprocal and 
non-reciprocal agents becomes apparent: there are more observations of permanent agents 
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have not responded reciprocally before. Conversely, there are many more permanent than 
temporary agents who receive a fixed wage > 20. These are the pairs of principals and 
permanent agents that have established a reciprocal relationship. 
 
Figure 3 – Panel A: Fixed wage with principals’ profits (upper part) and number of 
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 B: Fixed wage with principals’ profits (upper part) Figure 3 – Panel  and number of 


















































































Regressions in Table 7 confirm these results. In addition, they show that principals 
who pay different piece rates for the two agents in the INFO treatment earn significantly 
less  ceteris paribus from their interaction with temporary agents. In other words, 
temporary agents react negatively to discrimination, and the reaction is sufficiently strong 
to reduce the profit of the principal significantly, both for a discrimination dummy a
r the degree of discrimination as independent variables (see models III and IV). 
In summary, principals would have fared better, on average, by offering the 
theoretically optimal contract. However, this does not preclude that very profitable 
reciprocal relationships emerged between principals and (permanent) agents. Most 
  22
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 016importantly, discrimination between permanent and temporary agents leads to a reduction 
of principals’ profits in the INFO treatment, everything else equal. However, the effect is 
not significant for discrimination in fixed wages. 
 int  an
Dependent variable: profit of principal  Fr h 




III  IV 
 
Table 7: Determinants of profits of principals 
Principal profits per period from eraction with permanent
om inter ction wit




n rm nt  with ary 
Independent variables  I  II 
Fixed wage permanent agent  -0.48  
*** -0.47  





   
Piece rate wage permanent agent  - -
(0.05) 
y of fixed wages dummy *INFO 
ece rate wages dummy * 
O dummy 
(0 )  (0.10)  (0.10) 
s (absolute 
)  ) 





fort level temporary agent 
nstant - - -






   













-0.24* -  -0.12  - 
(0.13)    (0.13)   
I
INFO dummy 
-0.13 -  -0.24*  - 

















***  Period  .01 .01 .02 .02
 (0.01) 
0.07 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.00  Period 1 of phases 1, 2 
 




value) * INFO dummy 
 
nequality of piece rate 
- -0.03  -  0.01 
  (0.05   (0.05
I
value) * INFO dummy 
-  0.15  -  0.14  
    
***
(0.05) 
*** Fixed wage temporary agent  -  -  -0.68  -0.68  





***  Piece rate wage temporary agent  -  -  .15 .15
     (0.04)  (0.04) 














(   (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.22) 
N  720 720  720  720 
Note: Linear random effects regressions with individual-specific random effects and matching group-specific fixed 
effects. T columns show standardized coefficient estimates with their corresponding standard errors in the subsequent 
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5  Discussion and conclusion 
Although co-employment of permanent and temporary workers becomes more and more 
common, possibly generating new and stronger intra-firm conflicts, we are not aware of 
other attempts to study experimentally the effects of parallel short-term and long-term 
relationships in a principal-agent setting. In order to explore the impact of horizontal 
contract transparency in a setting where a principal faces one permanent and one 
temporary agent, we compare a situation in which agents know the contract details of both 
with
 by which 
prin
iprocal agents for discrimination or the 
expe
 a condition in which this is not the case. 
The experimental implementation of our setup provides several results. First, we find 
that principals discriminate between the two types of agents, even though the benchmark 
solution under standard assumptions implies no discrimination. On average, permanent 
agents in the treatment without disclosure of contract details receive significantly higher 
fixed wages and significantly higher piece rate wages than temporary agents. Second, 
making contracts of co-workers public within firms before effort determination leads to 
more equal treatment of agents, i.e., less discrimination. Third, agents react to unfair 
treatment by principals. They “punish” principals for being discriminated, on average, and 
“reward” principals for equal treatment in piece rate wages. Fourth, discrimination 
between permanent and temporary agents, on average, leads to a reduction of principals’ 
profits in the treatment with disclosure, everything else equal. Fifth, in the spirit of gift-
exchange, the fixed wage rather than the piece rate is the contract component
cipals trigger reciprocity, as in experiments where no piece rate is available. 
It is important to remember that discriminatory contracts in our setup are neither a 
consequence of money-maximizing behavior nor a consequence of a taste for 
discrimination. They exist because of reciprocal behavior together with reputational 
concerns. The number of reciprocal agents in the experiment is obviously too small to 
induce principals to offer generous contracts in one-shot interactions. Hence, temporary 
agents, on average, receive worse offers than permanent agents for whom reputational 
concerns in the repeated interaction suggest reciprocal behavior even of completely selfish 
agents (see Kreps et al. 1982). This effect is attenuated by information disclosure within 
the firm, probably because of a distaste of rec
ctation of principals regarding such distaste. 
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explanation for why temporary workers are paid less in companies than permanent 
workers. Principals invest less in the voluntary cooperation (reciprocity) of temporary 
workers. Second, information disclosure seems a good strategy against discrimination in 
such
evels of wages, effort and efficiency 
than equal treatment, when equal treatment is feasible. Here, we show that discrimination 
has a small, but negative effect on principals’ profits. 
 settings. If one wants to reduce discrimination, a policy of transparency could do the 
trick, at least to a considerable extent. 
In contrast to Charness and Kuhn (2007) our results show that co-workers contract 
details matter quite a bit. However, this difference in findings is not surprising. In our case, 
co-worker’s contract details are much more salient than in their case. Discrimination is 
obviously unfair, and agents are willing to “punish” contract structures that they perceive 
as unfair and “reward” contract structures they perceive as fair. Regarding the effects of 
unequal treatment of workers within the same firm, our results are in accordance with 
those of Kocher et al. (2009), who show that unequal treatment in a principal-agent 
framework with incomplete contracts leads to lower l
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necessarily for publication; for referees’ convenience) 
 
Experimental instructions 
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. For having shown up on time you will 
receive 2.50 euros. If you read these instructions carefully, you may earn more. In this experiment 
all amounts are denominated in ECU („experimental currency units“). In the end of the experiment 
earnings will be converted at the exchange rate 200 ECU = 1.00 euro and paid to you in cash. 
During the experiment, you are not allowed to talk to other participants. Whenever you have 
questions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to you and answer your questions 
individually. If you do not obey these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experiment. No 
payment will be provided in this case. 
 
The setting 
In the experiment, three participants interact in a labor market environment. These three include a 
producer P, a worker of type A, and a worker of type B. At the beginning of the experiment, you 
will be assigned one of the above roles. You will keep the given role during the entire experiment. 
Altogether, the experiment comprises two phases, each including ten periods. At the beginning of 
each phase, you will be randomly matched with two other participants to form a group of size 
three. Producer P and worker A interact with each other throughout an entire phase, i.e., during the 
whole ten periods. To the contrary, worker B is randomly re-matched with another producer P and 
worker A in every period. Note that it is possible that B encounters the same P and A whom he/she 
has encountered before. 
 
Your task 
Your task in the experiment depends on the role that is assigned to you. You will be informed 
about your actual role when the experiment starts. Even though you will be assigned to one 
particular role, we urge you to carefully study the characteristics of all four roles as this may help 
you to perform well in economic terms in the experiment. 
 
Producer P 
You are in charge of a firm in the manufacturing business which produces finished goods that are 
sold at the market. Both the market price and the demand for your goods are exogenously 
determined and will remain constant during the entire experiment. The price of the product is 4.00 
ECU. Since your firm is considered to be small, you are always able to sell your entire production. 
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worker  B. You may hire a worker by proposing a contract in which you can specify a (non-
negative) fixed wage component and a piece rate wage component. Additionally, you can (but 
don’t have to) specify the amount of work effort you wish worker A and/or B to exert in case of 
their employment. 
Please note that the amount of goods produced depends on the work effort workers A and/or B 
exercise, if you contracted them to work for you. If you contract neither one, your production will 
be zero and you will not realize any profit. Increasing production translates into increasing 
revenues from which your costs (both fixed and piece rate) for contracting A and/or B are 
deducted. Be aware of the risk that if your costs surpass your revenues, you will realize a net loss in 
the given period. 
 
Your payoff in each period is as follows: 
Revenue   =   price of the product * (work effort A + work effort B) 
Costs   =   fixed wage A + piece rate wage A * work effort A 
 +  fixed  wage  B + piece rate wage B * work effort B 
Profit P  =   revenue – costs 
 
Worker type A 
Producer P proposes a contract to you that comprises a (non-negative) fixed and/or a piece rate 
wage component. You receive the fixed wage component irrespective of your exerted effort. On 
the contrary, you only benefit from the piece rate wage component if you chose to exert work 
effort. The effort level stands for the number of goods that you produce in a given period. P might 
inform you about the amount of work effort he/she wishes you to exert. However, you do not have 
to follow this recommendation.  
Note that work effort is not for free. Increasing effort levels translate into progressively increasing 
effort costs. For your convenience, during the training phase effort costs will be immediately 
posted on your computer screen, once you have entered a particular effort level.  
 
Your payoff in each period is as follows: 
Profit A  =  fixed wage  
  +  piece rate wage * work effort  
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Worker type B 
The rules that hold for worker A also apply for you. However, there is one exception: while worker 
A interacts for one phase – thus ten periods – with the same producer, you will be assigned to a 
(possibly) new producer in every period.  
  
Your payoff in each period is as follows: 
Profit B =  fixed  wage 
  +  piece rate wage * work effort  
–   costs for work effort   
 
Course of events 
In each of the experiment’s twenty periods there is the same course of events. At first, P proposes a 
contract to A and/or to B. [Participants in INFO read: Subsequently, A and B are informed about 
the own contract specifications and those of the other worker.] [Participants in NOINFO read: 
Subsequently, A and B are informed about the own contract specifications.] Finally, each worker 
decides how much effort he/she wants to exert. Depending on the chosen work effort and the 
particular contract specifications, the profits for P, A, and B are computed. At the end of the period, 
you will be informed about your own payoff. Only producer P is additionally informed about the 
work effort chosen by workers A and/or B.  
 
Your payoff at the end of the experiment 
Your final payoff is the sum of your twenty periodic payoffs plus the show-up fee of € 2.50. If you 
conclude the experiment with a negative final payoff, we will ask you to do some administrative 
work for one hour at the Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in Jena. 
 
Questionnaire and Training 
Before the experiment starts, we kindly ask you to complete the questionnaire that is displayed on 
your computer screen. The questions are asked to ensure that you have fully understood the rules of 
the experiment. After completing the questionnaire, you will have the possibility to familiarize 
yourself with the experiment during ten training periods. During this time, you will act alone. 
Hence, you will not be informed about the decisions of other participants and vice versa. Note 
that the training periods will not affect your final payoff. 
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